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Introduction
The current stage of human development can be 
called information society and information econo-
my. Information has become not only one of the 
strategic resources of the economy next to capital, 
human and natural resources, but even exceeded 
these classic factors in importance. 
With the globalization of the world economy, espe-
cially in the financial sector, the volume of informa-
tion is rapidly increasing. It is becoming more diffi-
cult and sometimes impossible to handle it. At the 
same time the making of economic and investment 
decisions requires deep analysis of the situation. 
Economic agents which have partially taken over 
the functions of information intermediaries are cre-
dit rating agencies (further referred to as rating 
agencies and RA). Rating agencies indirectly, 
through exposure ratings, give signals to one eco-
nomic subject on the state of others. 
Nevertheless, the activity of credit rating agencies 
has been largely discredited recently due to the big 
number of internal and external factors. Without 
claiming to solve all the problems of credit rating 
agencies, this paper provides recommendations on 
improving the methodology of credit rating agencies 
based on the stock markets information. 
1. Credit rating agencies and information  
asymmetry reduction
In the developed countries credit ratings are the 
essential elements of the market infrastructure that 
provide investors with objective and independent 
information on the creditworthiness of borrowers. 
In fact, credit rating is a measure that reflects the 
creditworthiness of the company, region or country, 
and reliability of securities. Such rating is calculated 
on the basis of past and current financial state of 
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ranking objects and based on assessments of their 
property and assumed debt [15]. 
Credit rating is an independent subjective quality 
assessment, which helps investors to determine the 
degree of credibility and to make an investment 
decision [16]. 
Credit rating agency’s opinions on the creditworthi-
ness of the rated object in general and/or relative to its 
particular debt or other financial instrument expressed 
in the form of ratings on a credit ratings scale [10]. 
Thus, the main function of the rating agencies is to 
provide impartial and unbiased information (at least 
it should be so). However, more than 100 years of 
history of the rating services, and the current state of 
the global financial system determine the presence 
of several additional arguments in favor of credit 
rating agencies: 
1. Ratings serve as a valid reference to the market, 
providing vitally necessary information to in-
vestors.
2. Availability of rating increases the liquidity of 
certain financial instruments. 
3. Availability of rating reduces price of the debt, 
because the absence of rating will lead to inclu-
sion in the price of the debt such element as risk 
premium. 
4. Rating enhances the image of the issuer and 
creates a positive reputation in the investment 
and in the banking world. 
5. Ratings serve as a universal tool of risk as-
sessment. 
6. Ratings are made by professionals, who explains 
their high quality. 
7. Companies do not need to keep staff of analysts 
to evaluate financial risks. 
8. Ratings are independent estimates, that makes 
them objective. 
9. Ratings are effective informational and promo-
tional tools – by publishing them the object of 
rating can declare itself to the world. 
10. Rating assignment indicates the transparency 
and openness of the rating object. 
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11. Rating process helps identify weaknesses in the 
object of rating and to correct them. 
12. Large investment firms, forming investment 
portfolio, focus primarily on the rating of the 
issuer. 
13. Investment in a particular company by invest-
ment funds, often depends on the rating of the 
investment object [2, 3, 5, 14, 15, 18, 19]. 
2. Main problems of the credit rating agencies 
nowadays 
Despite the obvious need in credit rating agencies in 
the modern economic life, there exists a critical 
mass of problems associated with their activities, 
which raises the question of their right to exist (Ta-
ble 1 and Table 2). 
Table 1. Internal problems and shortcomings in the present existence of credit rating agencies  
[1, 3, 5, 13, 14, 18, 21, 31, 32, 33] 
Problem or shortcoming Characteristic
Low quality of ratings 
RA gave high ratings to a very wide range of risk assets, including the infamous mortgage securities. It misled millions of inves-
tors who relied on their independent objective assessment. 
To the inadequacy of ratings point the bankruptcies of corporations with the highest or high ratings from RA (Enron, WorldCom, 
Parmalat, Lehman Brothers). 
After the global crisis Moody's recognized that they had given inflated ratings to some issuers. The differences between market
returns and bond ratings of issuers have increased. It means big differences between the market measurement of reliability of 
debtors and rating agencies. 
Sufficient costs on rating 
process The cost of rating is 65000-70000 USD for the initial assessment and 35000-40000 USD í for annual updates. 
Opacity Methodology and characteristics of each RA’s rating exposure are not disclosed.
Shortcomings in the business 
processes of the RA 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) revealed a number of “obvious failures” in the activity of RA. In particular, the
inability of agencies in some cases: to follow methods and procedures of ratings calculations, timely and accurately publish 
adequate information, to create effective internal management structures of RA, to resolve conflicts of interest adequately. 
Besides RA often violated documentation procedure, as a result, some information on assigning ratings was not recorded. 
Lack of professionals among 
the employees of RA RA do not have enough professional staff – the workload on analysts has increased tenfold in recent years.  
Absence of effective control 
mechanism on RA activity 
Until recently, the activity of RA was not controlled by state structures neither in the U.S. nor in Europe. Only the events of the
last global financial crisis and the role of RA in it forced the United States and Europe to pay more attention to the issues of
control over the RA. 
Ratings do not reflect all risks Ratings are aimed to assess creditability of the borrowers, while their potential bankruptcy depends on a number of other factors.
Rating process is not quite 
objective 
Despite the formal availability of prescribed methods of assigning ratings, there is much room for individual assessments by
analysts of RA. This is possible because methods do not restrict the use of “other significant facts” in making decisions regarding
the assignment of a rating. 
Time lags Ratings are assigned with delays (sometimes, months) and, consequently, do not match the current economic state of therating object. 
Lack of responsibility RA usually takes no responsibility for their evaluation. Very rarely deceived investors can obtain compensation from the RA.
Conflict of interest 
RAs get most of their income from the ratings objects. This, of course, leads to a conflict of interest. Top management of RA often
interferes in the work of analysts and demands “correct” conclusions for “best customers”. 
The common practice is when RA analysts participate in discussions about payments and discuss with clients their future ratings.
Methodological shortcomings 
Techniques that were used to compile ratings to mortgage-backed securities did not work. There were no documented proce-
dures for the evaluation of complicated financial instruments, including mortgage-backed securities í RMBS (subprime residential 
mortgage-backed securities), and secured debt obligations í CDO (collateralized debt obligations). There was no algorithm of 
evaluation too. 
Table 2. External problems and shortcomings in the present existence of credit rating agencies  
[1, 3, 4, 11, 13, 17, 30] 
Problem or shortcoming Characteristic
RA may cause defaults 
The assignment of low rating does not only make difficult the obtaining of financial resources from external 
sources to company or country, but also discourages the existing investors. 
At the country level, the decrease of ratings for Greece, Portugal, Spain and Italy contributed to the debt crisis in 
the EU. 
Rating services market is highly  
monopolized 
More then 90% of rating services in global market is concentrated in three companies – Moody’s, Standard & 
Poor’s and Fitch.  
Ratings can be used as a tool of pressure on 
the clients by the RA 
RA may use ratings as a tool of pressure on clients. Thus, when the German company Hannover Re has refused 
to cooperate with Moody's, analysts of this agency lowered ratings of Hannover Re. It did not change the opinion 
of Hannover Re managers. As a result securities of Hannover RE were lowered to the level of “unreliable”. In 
several hours the company lost $175 million of its market value. 
Obligation to provide rating 
It can take certain forms (for example, in Ukraine the rating is required for companies which have a state share in 
their capital; companies of strategic importance to the national economy and security; businesses that have a 
monopoly (dominating) position), and implicit form í pension and investment funds are may invest only in securi-
ties with relevant international ratings. 
RA may act as an object of political pressure  
There are well known examples of Canada and Australia. In these countries the downgrading of sovereign rating 
before the elections led to a change in the ruling political party. In 2003 ratings of some German companies were 
downgraded because of Germany’s disagreement with the U.S. on the issue of Iraq war. 
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Table 2 (cont.). External problems and shortcomings in the present existence of credit rating agencies  
[1, 3, 4, 11, 13, 17, 30] 
Problem or shortcoming Characteristic
RA contribute to panic on stock markets In August 2011 the credit rating agency Standard & Poor's downgraded the long-term credit rating of the U.S. That caused panic in the stock markets and, in fact, provoked the beginning of a new phase of the global crisis. 
Double standards in the rating process 
“The big three” have successfully applied double standards. For example, the high rate of public debt in several 
major western countries (e.g. in 2007 in Japan, public debt was 195,4% of GDP, in Italy í 104%) did not justify the 
downgrade of the ratings because these countries, according to analysts of the rating agencies, were too rich and 
developed. But even a small deterioration in macroeconomic indicators in other countries immediately leads to 
downgrades of their sovereign ratings. 
RA as the catalyst of the current global crisis 
The activities of the leading credit rating agencies in the U.S. contributed to the financial crisis. Part of this guilt 
was confirmed by the agencies, which admitted that “the grounds for granting a higher rating to thousands of 
mortgage securities were little”. 
3. Credit rating agencies: methodology  
analysis 
Credit rating agencies work in different sectors of 
economic activity – from material production to fi-
nancial institutions like banks, insurance companies 
and others. The main instrument of their work is cre-
dit rating. 
The range of activities of the leading international 
credit rating agencies is rather wide as we see from the 
objects of ranking. The rating can be assigned not only 
to governments, regional or local government entities, 
but also to securities issued by them. 
In general, the methodology of different agencies is 
very similar and consists of complex of financial 
and economic analysis of ranking objects plus a 
number of additional factors which may exert influ-
ence on creditability of the issuer. As regards sove-
reign rating, usually three groups of indicators are 
used for its determination: 
i dynamics of economic growth; 
i inflation, public finances and the current account; 
i state and development of the banking sector. 
General characteristics of the leading rating agen-
cies and features of their methodology are presented 
in Table 3. 
Table 3. General characteristics of the leading credit rating agencies [26, 28, 29] 
Credit rating 
agency Characteristic of the agency Key criteria in the rating exposure 
Moody’s 
Rating agency provides ratings and publishes conclusions on the creditwor-
thiness of issuers and credit quality of issued securities. Assigns a rating of 
debt obligations of banks, corporations, insurance companies, funds, regional 
and local administrations, states and international organizations. 
Company conducts the analysis of the capital markets in more than 110 
countries. 
Moody’s also assigns ratings in some jurisdictions on a national scale (Na-
tional Scale Ratings), which can not be used for comparison with the ratings 
assigned to other countries. 
1. Market share and position among competitors. 
2. Cost structure and effectiveness of capital use. 
3. Financial flexibility. 
4. Management quality. 
5. Strategic management. 
Standard and 
Poor’s
Credit ratings are assigned to issuers (government, regional and local 
governments, corporations, financial institutions, insurance companies, 
funds, etc.) or debt obligations. 
Standard & Poor's assigns ratings on the international scale (for liabilities in 
national and foreign currency) and on a national scale, which is created 
specifically for each country. 
1. Business risk. 
2. Country risk. 
3. Production factors. 
4. Competitive position. 
5. Profitability. 
6. Financial risk. 
7. Management. 
8. Financial policy (adequacy of cash flows, capital 
structure, liquidity, etc.). 
Fitch 
Agency provides independent analysis and is focused on future analytical 
studies on credit ratings. Fitch staff works in 50 offices worldwide and con-
ducts analysis on the capital markets in more than 150 countries. 
Assigns international and local credit ratings to banks, non-bank financial 
institutions, insurance companies, issuers of the corporate sector, regional 
and local authorities, governments. Fitch also rates issues of debt instru-
ments with fixed income and structured finance transactions. 
1. Situation in the industry and operational environment. 
2. Management strategy and corporate governance. 
3. Ownership structure and other factors. 
4. Country risks. 
5. Characteristics of company (financial indicators, cash 
flows, earnings, capital structure, financial flexibility, 
financial statements). 
Let us look at the rating procedure by using Moo-
dy’s methodology. 
The procedure of assigning a credit rating in Moo-
dy’s can be divided into six phases: analysis, pre-
liminary meeting, meeting with management, the 
rating decision, the rating publication, the rating 
monitoring. 
In the process of analysis the agency examines the 
internal environment of the country in which the 
issuer operates. Analysts are primarily interested in 
economical, political and cultural environment. 
In analyzing the economic environment the agency 
is interested in the general macroeconomic situation, 
investment opportunities in the country, in the state 
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of liquidity and debt. In studying the political envi-
ronment the attention is paid to the level and quality 
of the reforms conducted in the country, the level of 
legislation and relations with other countries. As for 
the cultural environment, the primary attention is 
paid to the national features of business and mentali-
ty of the population. 
Based on the received information, analysts are 
trying to determine the ability of the issuer to re-
spond to changes in economic and political envi-
ronment of the country. For this purpose the compa-
ny’s competitiveness, the quality of its operational 
and strategic management, financial flexibility and 
cost structure are analyzed. 
At the same time, there is no clearly fixed standard 
set of indicators and factors that are required for 
analysis. The agency actively consults with the 
company concerning the usefulness of certain indi-
cator and the need of certain calculations. 
After the analysis preliminary meeting is carried 
out. During the meeting the management of the 
company is informed about the features of the rating 
procedure and information needs of the agency. If a 
principle agreement about further cooperation is 
reached, there is a working meeting with the com-
pany, during which a wide range of issues are dis-
cussed – from history and general information about 
the company, to the specific things like financial 
planning and investment policy. 
As a result of this meeting, based on information 
obtained in the previous stages, and after careful 
consideration, the rating decision is made. Rating 
decision is taken by the rating committee in New 
York with the obligatory participation of foreign 
offices of Moody’s. 
Immediately after the decision is made, the agency 
reports to the company management about the rating 
level and gives its justification. Then Moody’s pub-
lishes the rating using press releases which are sent 
to the world’s leading information agencies and 
through its own publications. It should be noted that 
Moody’s has its own page on the terminals of the 
leading information companies í Reuter, Dow Jones 
Telerate and Bloomberg [28]. 
One of the features of the rating process of the lead-
ing international rating agencies is the publishing of 
ratings before the issue of the analyzed debt instru-
ment. This gives investors the possibility to use the 
opinion of the rating agencies in making investment 
decisions.
The final step of the rating procedure is rating moni-
toring, i.e. the agency is constantly analyzing data, 
generated by the company or its environment, in 
order to keep the rating in adequate conditions. 
4. The necessity of incorporation of stock  
information into the methodology of  
rating agencies 
Every minute and even second stock markets give 
ratings to various components of the economic sys-
tem – countries and businesses. This rating is the 
market price of stocks or, in case of bonds, yield of 
bonds. 
Stock prices not only reflect the estimates made by 
the market for a particular financial instrument, but 
also directly affect the creditworthiness of potential 
borrower. The price fall of the corporation stocks 
reduces its potential for obtaining borrowed funds, 
which in turn reduces its solvency. 
At the same time stock market information is not a 
mandatory element of methodology of the leading 
credit rating agencies and at the most can serve as a 
signal for further analysis. To prove this we have 
analyzed methodologies of different credit rating 
agencies in terms of necessity or at least desirability 
of taking into account stock market information in 
the process of preparation and review of ratings 
(Table 4). 
According to the analysis of methodological ap-
proaches used by Moody’s, information from stock 
markets does not refer to the priority criteria, and 
also is not mentioned among the other factors which 
are taken into account [28]. 
The only leading credit rating agency the methodol-
ogy of which contains formal recognition of the 
impact of stock prices is Standard and Poor’s. 
Stock price is one of many factors which this credit 
rating agency may consider in determining the rat-
ing of the company. Nevertheless, stock price is not 
the main factor in determining the creditworthiness 
of companies. Stock prices are interesting for Stan-
dard and Poor’s only from the point of view of the 
big falls in prices for the analysis of the reasons that 
caused them. If these reasons were not revealed, the 
dynamics of prices is ignored. 
In addition, the methodology of Standard and Poor’s 
indicates that an important factor is the volatility of 
market prices for a particular asset, so they analyze 
the historical values of volatility of stock exchange 
assets. Standard and Poor’s methodology is the only 
one which recognizes the need of incorporation of 
information from stock markets in the form of prices 
and their dynamics. But the methodology of Stan-
dard and Poor’s allows to ignore this information, 
because it belongs only to the optional criteria [29].  
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Table 4. Analysis of the methodologies of the leading credit rating agencies for the purpose of incorporation 
of market information into their rating process [26-29] 
Credit rating 
agency Key criteria in the rating process 
The necessity of the mar-
ket’s information  
incorporation 
Desirability of the market’s 
information incorporation 
Moody’s 
1. Market share and position among competitors.
2. Cost structure and effectiveness of capital use. 
3. Financial flexibility. 
4. Management quality. 
5. Strategic management. 
No No 
Standard and 
Poor’s
1. Business risk. 
2. Country risk. 
3. Production factors. 
4. Competitive position. 
5. Profitability. 
6. Financial risk. 
7. Management. 
8. Financial policy (adequacy of cash flows, capital structure, liquidity, etc.). 
No Yes 
Fitch 
1. Situation in the industry and operational environment.
2. Strategy management and corporate governance. 
3. Ownership structure, maintenance and other important factors. 
4. Country risks. 
5. Characteristics of company (financial indicators, cash flows, earnings, 
capital structure, financial flexibility, financial statements). 
No No 
Japan Rating 
and Investment 
1. Characteristics of the industry. 
2. Key factors in the market position and competitiveness. 
3. Management and strategy: 
i Analysis of income. 
i Cash flow. 
i Liquidity. 
4. Safety. 
No No 
To confirm our previous observations, we analyzed 
rating reports by Fitch on Russian companies 
“MTS” and “Severstal”. 
According to the rating report on MTS from Sep-
tember 23, 2010, the company was assigned a long-
term rating AA (rus) (on the national scale) and BB 
+ rating on the international scale [26]. 
The report contains no mention of the stock prices 
of MTS and their dynamics. Among the factors 
which may lead to a change in rating, the dynamics 
of stock prices was not present although in the past 
2 years stocks lost more than 35% of the value 
(Table 7). The analysis of volatility in general 
shows that during the past two years, there were 
periods when stocks lost 80% of their value. Fluc-
tuations in the last six months have the amplitude 
of almost 22%. 
Table 5. Analysis of the dynamics and volatility of 
MTS stock prices [34] 
  2 years 1 year 0.5 year
Maximum 384.3 276.98 276.98
Minimum 80.62 195 217
Volatility, % -79.02% -29.60% -21.65%
Price as on September 23, 2010 248.5 248.5 248.5
Change, % -35.34% -10.28% -10.28%
To ensure that the MTS case is no exception, we 
reviewed the report made by Fitch on one more 
Russian company – “Severstal”. 
“Severstal” received A+ (rus) rating on the national 
scale and BB- on the international scale. On May 19, 
2011 the rating was raised from “B +” to “BB-” [26]. 
This company is very dependent on market condi-
tions and market prices. In particular, the dynamics 
of metal prices directly affects the amount of reve-
nue. At the same time no analysis of prices for met-
als, no analysis of stock prices of the issuer was 
done. There was not even a mention of these para-
meters and, consequently, their incorporation into 
the rating process.  
The level of volatility of “Severstal” stocks and their 
prices (Table 8) shows no improvement in market 
valuations. Over the past two years there were pe-
riods when stocks lost almost 80% of their own 
value. Over the past six months, shares have lost 
more than 15%. On this background the improve-
ment of the rating does not look quite logical. 
Table 6. Analysis of the dynamics and volatility of 
“Severstal” share prices [34] 
2 years 1 year 0.5 year
Maximum 598.58 598.58 598.58
Minimum 140.1 294.36 446.2
Volatility, % -76.59% -50.82% -25.46%
Price on September 23, 2010 507.5 507.5 507.5
Change, % -15.22% -15.22% -15.22%
A similar pattern is typical for RA Japan Credit 
Rating Agency and Moody’s. 
Investment Management and Financial Innovations, Volume 9, Issue 3, 2012
13
We have analyzed the reports of Japan Credit Rating 
Agency on such companies as Bridgestone Corpora-
tion and Kawasaki Heavy Industries, Ltd. Reports 
on these corporations do not contain information 
about the situation with their stocks on the stock 
exchange. Also it is not mentioned that the stock 
prices are somehow taken into account in determin-
ing the rating. 
At the same time, ignoring the information from 
stock markets can lead to errors in assessments and 
ratings and to misunderstanding of the general situa-
tion. The history of the credit rating agencies knew 
many examples of their incompetence. With the 
global financial crisis, the number of such failures 
has increased significantly.  
In our opinion, the majority of stains on the reputa-
tion of credit rating agencies could have been 
avoided if they had taken into account the informa-
tion from the financial markets. 
To prove this we will analyze the largest mistakes of 
credit rating agencies í bankruptcies and defaults of 
such corporations as Enron, WorldCom and Lehman 
Brothers. We will not analyze in detail the causes 
and consequences of these failures, because it is not 
the aim of the study, we will only consider the ac-
tions of RA on the background of dynamics of stock 
prices of these corporations. We will compare the 
ratings given by the market with RA estimations and 
determine who are right in the end. 
On December 2, 2001 Enron officially announced 
its bankruptcy. One of the largest energy companies 
in the world conducted unwise investment policies 
and machinations with reporting. Credit rating 
agencies until the last moment did not believe in the 
possibility of bankruptcy of this corporation, as 
evidenced by dynamic of Enron corporate rating 
updates (see Table 7). At the same time stock prices 
(Figure 1) of the corporation gave clear signals 
about the existing threats. 
Fig. 1 Dynamics of Enron stock prices and S&P 500 [6] 
Table 7. Enron stock price changes and actions of credit rating agencies [28, 29] 
Date Enron stock price changes Reaction of credit rating agencies Comments 
27.03.01 -30% No reaction. No reaction.
21.06.01 -50% No reaction. No reaction.
16.10.01 -75% 
1. Standard & Poor’s confirmed Enron rating on the 
level BBB+ with stable outlook. 
2. Moody’s posted rating on review with possible 
downgrade. 
S&P expressed confidence that the company’s equity will be restored 
and the selling of non-core assets and the additional issue of shares 
will reduce debt and reduce costs. It was assumed that in case of falling 
stock prices investment will be financed mainly from Enron’s own funds. 
29.10.01 -80% Moody’s downgraded Enron rating to BAA2 with possible further downgrade. Information is absent. 
01.11.01 -85% Standard & Poor’s downgraded Enron rating to BBB.
S&P acknowledged that the company plans to restore their balance are 
insufficient primarily because of the reaction of the stock and debt 
markets. However, liquidity problems did not exist, because the sales 
on the energy market, including EnronOnline, remained stable. 
09.11.01 -90% 
1. Standard & Poor's downgraded Enron rating 
to BBB-. 
2. Moody’s downgraded Enron rating to BAA3. 
Dynegy offered to buy Enron at a price of $10.41 (capitalization in this 
case was 9.4 billion dollars). 
28.11.01 -98% Standard & Poor’s downgraded Enron rating to B-. Dynegy rejected the deal, Enron was excluded from the Standard & Poor’s 500 index. 
02.12.01 -100% No reaction. Bankruptcy.
03.12.01 -100% Moody’s downgraded Enron rating to CA. Information is absent.
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Apparently, the RA ignored stock markets estima-
tions about the current status and prospects of 
Enron. 30% and 50% drops in capitalization of 
Enron had no affect on their assessments, while the 
methodology of Standard & Poor’s in fact provides, 
among other factors, the control over the prices of 
issuer’s shares, but obviously no such control was 
carried out or at least its results were ignored. The 
evidence of this was the confirmation of Enron rat-
ing by S&P on October, 16, 2001 at the same level 
(a half month before the bankruptcy, against a 75% 
fall of the stock price. The rating agency believed 
that the condition of the issuer had not worsened 
and in the nearest future would not be changing). 
Only when the process totally got out of control, the 
financial conditions became extremely negative and 
the prospects became obvious to everyone, RA 
started to gradually downgrade their ratings. The 
key word to the last phrase is “gradually”. Ratings 
were downgraded only one degree, but not drastical-
ly, as required by the actual situation. 
Another example of practical realization of the short-
comings of RA is the bankruptcy of WorldCom.  
The analysis of the exchange markets information 
and actions of credit rating agencies in case of 
WorldCom is presented in Table. 8. The dynamics 
of WorldCom stock prices is presented on Figure 2. 
Table 8. WorldCom stock price changes and actions of credit rating agencies [26,28] 
Date
WorldCom 
stock price 
changes 
Reaction of credit rating agencies Comments 
05.09.2000 -20% Fitch confirmed rating “A” for WorldCom. Took place on the background of the merger of WorldCom with intermedia.
03.11.2000 -20% Moody's confirmed the rating of WorldCom on the level “A3” with stable outlook. Information is absent. 
08.05.2001 -60% Moody's confirmed the rating of WorldCom on the level A3 with stable outlook. Information is absent. 
09.05.2001 -60% Fitch graded WorldCom obligations on level “A-”. Information is absent.
1101.2002 -80% Fitch downgraded WorldCom rating to BBB+. 
Downgrade was explained by the expectations that the potential of 
WorldCom did not have the level of A-. 
However, Fitch believed that WorldCom had good market positions and 
that the problems of the corporation were caused by the current weak state 
of the economy. 
07.02.2002 -80% Moody’s gave the rating (Ⱥ3) with the possibility of downgrade. 
Possible downgrade caused by fears of RA of a smaller income of the 
corporation in 2002. 
23.04.2002 -90% Moody’s downgraded WorldCom rating from Ⱥ3to ȼȺȺ2 with negative outlook. 
Downgrade caused by the revision of income of the corporation for the 
year 2002, which was significantly lower of the expectations of RA. 
Simultaneously, Moody’s noted that they did not believe in liquidity prob-
lems of WorldCom in 2002. 
09.05.2002 -95% 
1. Moody’s downgraded WorldCom rating from 
ȼɚɚ2 to ȼɚ2 with negative outlook. 
2. Fitch downgraded WorldCom rating to BB with 
negative outlook. 
1. Downgrade caused by significant deterioration in operation activity of the 
company. 
The rating of BA2 level reflects Moody’s expectations of successful negoti-
ations to extend the credit line of 2.65 billion dollars. 
2. The negative prognosis was caused by the expectations of weak indica-
tors of operational activity and uncertainty in the company's ability to 
generate sufficient cash flows. 
20.06.2002 -100% 
1. Moody’s downgraded WorldCom rating from 
ȼȺ2 to ȼ1.
2. Fitch downgraded WorldCom rating from ȼȼ to 
B with negative outlook. 
1. The rating was explained by the failure of the company to pay interest 
on debt. 
RA closely observed the progress of SEC investigation of WorldCom. 
2. The rating was explained by the company’s refusal to pay interest on debt. 
26.06.2002 -100% Moody’s downgraded WorldCom rating from ȼ1to ɋɚ with negative outlook. 
The rating was explained by the detection of fraud in the financial reporting 
of WorldCom corporation. 
22.07.2002 - 100% Fitch downgraded WorldCom rating to D. Downgrade was caused by the initiation of bankruptcy procedure of WorldCom.
Fig. 2 Dynamics of WorldCom stock prices in 1998-2002 [7] 
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None of the ratings considered the dynamics of 
WorldCom stocks prices, despite the fact that they 
signaled problems inside the corporation long before 
the first RA downgrade or even review ratings. 
The latest example is the bankruptcy of Lehman 
Brothers. This example is important because it 
shows that no lessons had been learned by RA and 
no conclusions have been drawn from Enron and 
WorldCom bankruptcies. 
The analysis of the stock market information and 
actions of credit rating agencies in the case of 
Lehman Brothers is presented in Table 9. Figure 3 
shows the dynamics of Lehman Brothers stock 
prices. 
Fig. 3. The dynamics of Lehman Brothers stock prices 2007-2008 [20] 
Table 9. The analysis of the stock market information and actions of rating agencies  
in the case of Lehman Brothers [26, 28] 
Date
Lehman Brothers 
stock price 
changes 
Reaction of credit rating agencies Comments 
17.03.2008 -30% Moody’s gave Ⱥ1 level with stable outlook. 
The rating was caused by the fact that Lehman behaved very well in condi-
tions of instability and high volatility in financial markets. 
01.04.2008 -50% 
Fitch gave Lehman the rating
of “AȺ-” with an outlook ranging from 
stable to negative. 
The change of prognosis was caused by the increased pressure on companies’
profits associated with the situation on the housing market. At the same time, 
Fitch plans to assign the rating of A+ to preferred shares of the company. 
16.04.2008 -55% Fitch gave the preferred shares of Leh-man the level of Ⱥ+.
Fitch believes that the issue of $4 billion of preferred shares is fully covered 
by the capital of the company. 
09.06.2008 -65% 
1. Fitch downgraded Lehman rating from 
ȺȺ- to Ⱥ+, with negative outlook. 
2. Moody's changed Lehman rating 
outlook to negative. 
Changes in the rating were connected to the publication of the corporation’s 
financial performance. In the 2nd quarter of 2008 – it had a net loss amount-
ing to 2.8 billion dollars. The negative outlook was caused by large quantities 
of high risk assets. 
13.06.2008 - 65% Moody’s gave Lehman Ⱥ1 level with the further possibilities of a downgrade. 
The rating was caused by the news about the resignation of the president and 
chief financial manager of the corporation. This news, in turn, was caused by the 
announcement of 2.8 billion dollars net losses in the second quarter of 2008. 
17.06.2008 -75% Moody's downgraded Lehman to A2 with negative prognosis. The rating was explained by the expectations of further losses of the corporation. 
09.09.2008 -90% Fitch considered the possibility of down-grading Lehman rating (current rating Ⱥ+). 
The rating was caused by the impact of negative factors on the financial 
stability of the company and its’ ability to generate capital. 
10.09.2008 -90% Moody’s considered the possibility of downgrading Lehman A2 rating. 
The rating was caused by the plan of Lehman debt restructuring and financial 
results in the Q3 2008, when losses amounted to 3.9 billion. 
The uncertainty in predictions is explained by the reduced financial flexibility 
of the corporation and the crisis of confidence, as evidenced by the fall in
stocks to historic lows.
15.09.2008 -95% 
1. Moody’s downgraded Lehman to ȼ3
with negative prognosis. 
2. Fitch downgraded Lehman from Ⱥ+ to D. 
Lehman initiated bankruptcy procedure. 
27.10.2008  Fitch withdrew Lehman Brothers rating. Information is absent.
8.12.2008  Moody's downgraded Lehman to ȼ3 with further withdrawal Information is absent. 
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The situation with Lehman Brothers bankruptcy is 
very similar to other situations we studied in the 
article. It can be argued that no conclusions have 
been drawn by RA.
Despite the fact that information from financial 
markets gives clear signals about the state of corpo-
rations, credit rating agencies, using the absence of 
formal requirements to incorporate information 
from exchange markets during the rating procedure, 
in order not to lose good customers, give incorrect 
estimates, which sometimes lead to very serious 
consequences. If earlier these were the problems on 
the local level, nowadays they are becoming global 
problems with global consequences. 
Counterarguments on the need of incorporation of 
information from exchange markets into the rating 
process include: speculative nature of modern ex-
change markets, the emergence of so-called “price 
bubbles” which do not reflect the real economic 
processes, but the mood of traders, the majority of 
whom have purely speculative interests [17]. 
Information from stock markets makes a serious 
impact on the creditworthiness of borrower, and, 
consequently, on their credit rating. This impact in 
particular includes: 
1. Reputation sensitive business (“Confidence-
sensitivity”). Some organizations such as banks, 
insurance, investment companies, are very depen-
dent on the level of confidence both from custom-
ers and investors. Falling stock prices of such 
companies, of course, make negative influence on 
their reputation, which, in turn, leads to a narrow-
ing of their resource base and to the deterioration 
of operation activity. 
2. Access to capital. One of the strategies to restore 
solvency is to increase capital by selling stocks 
(equity financing). If the stock price is high, the 
sale of stocks can be an effective instrument of 
capital acquisition. The issue of stocks in this 
case will bring significant growth of the capital. 
In the case of low stock prices this strategy will 
be ineffective and the amount of emission must 
be significantly increased. This will lead to ero-
sion of already existing stocks, which in turn 
will lead to resistance from shareholders espe-
cially from minority ones. 
3. Changes in stock prices as signals. Sharp and 
significant changes in stock prices may take 
place accidentally because of general market 
trend or local panic, but also may reflect signifi-
cant events affecting the company. These events, 
in turn, may significantly affect the creditworthi-
ness of the company. 
Therefore, we believe that incorporation of informa-
tion from stock markets into the rating process and 
its methodology will help to solve some problems of 
RA, which we have outlined, and to avoid defaults of 
the first class borrowers and to improve the adequacy 
of the ratings. We propose some methodological im-
provements based on stock market information. 
The proposed actions of credit rating agencies based 
on the received stock information are listed in Table 10. 
Table 10. Proposed actions of credit rating agencies based on the received stock information 
Stock information Proposed action of rating agencies 
Analysis of stock prices dynamics during the last period* 
Stock prices during last period 
dropped by more then 20% 
Analysis of the causes of the fall in stock prices is required. 
According to the analysis í if the reasons are serious – announcement about the possible revision of the rating. 
Stock prices during last period 
dropped by more then 50% 
Downgrade rating by one position with a negative outlook. 
Analysis of the causes of the fall in stock prices is required. If the factors are severe – possible downgrade by several 
positions. 
Stock prices during last period 
dropped by more then 80% 
Downgrade rating by several positions with a negative outlook. 
Analysis of the causes of the fall in stock prices is required. If the factors are severe – possible withdrawal of rating. 
Stock prices during last period in-
creased by more then 20% 
Analysis of the causes of the rise in stock prices is required. 
According to the analysis – announcement of upgrade of the rating or leaving it unchanged. 
Stock prices during last period in-
creased by more then 50% 
Analysis of the causes of rise in stock prices is required. 
According to the analysis, if there are no other contradicting factors – upgrade of the rating. 
Analysis of volatility during the last period 
Volatility increased more then 50% 
The analysis of the causes of price volatility in stocks is required. 
If there are negative factors – evaluation of their scale with possible downward rating or assigning negative outlook. 
If increasing volatility is associated with an increase in stock prices, the analysis of the causes of excessive demand 
with possible revision of the rating upward or providing a positive outlook. 
If causes are uncertain, further monitoring of market fluctuations and analyzing of their causes. 
Volatility increased more then 100% 
Analysis of the causes of price volatility in stocks is required. 
If there are negative factors – evaluation of their scale with possible downward rating or assigning negative outlook. 
If increase in volatility is associated with increase in stock prices, analysis of the causes of excessive demand with 
possible revision of the rating upward or providing a positive outlook. 
If causes are uncertain, further monitoring of market fluctuations and analyzing of their causes.  
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Table 10 (cont.). Proposed actions of credit rating agencies based on the received stock information 
Stock information Proposed action of rating agencies 
Volatility increased more then 200%  
Analysis of the causes of price volatility in stocks is required.
If there are negative factors – evaluation of their scale with necessary downgrade of the rating and assigning negative 
outlook. 
In case of increase in volatility associated with an increase in stock prices, analysis of the causes of excessive demand 
with upward rating and providing a positive outlook. 
If causes are uncertain, downgrading of rating in case of further negative price dynamics, further monitoring of market 
fluctuations and analyzing of their causes. 
Note: *Under the “last period” we generally mean one year, however, depending on the purpose and features of the analysis, it can
be half or a quarter of a year. 
We propose to analyze the information in the fol-
lowing two ways í the analysis of the price dynam-
ics (the relative growth or decline in stock prices 
during the last periods of control), and analysis of 
price volatility (the size of fluctuations of market 
assets), which actually describes the growing inter-
est in certain shares. It can be a positive interest 
(great demand for shares of companies) and a nega-
tive one (in this case, volatility indicates the market 
uncertainty, the anticipated panic). 
Summary and conclusion 
Summing up the results, we can say that credit rating 
agencies are important elements of the modern eco-
nomic system, because they help to orientate oneself in 
the ocean of information. Recently, the activity of 
rating agencies has been largely discredited. This was 
caused by a number of internal and external reasons. 
We have offered recommendations on improving the 
methodology based on incorporation of the stock mar-
ket information into the process of rating. 
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